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Knowledge and Control:
On the Bearing of Epistemic Values in Applied Science
Martin Carrier
Bielefeld University
The Primacy of Applied Science
Among the general public, the esteem for science does not primarily
arise from the fact that science endeavors to capture the structure of
the universe or the principles that govern the tiniest parts of matter.
Rather, public esteem - and public funding - is for the greater part
based an the assumption that science has a positive impact an the
economy and contributes to securing or creating Jobs. Consequently,
applied science, not pure research, receives the lion's share of attention
and Support. lt is not knowledge that is highly evaluated in the first
place but control of natural phenomena. The relationship between
science and technology is widely represented by the so-called cascade
model. This model conceives of technological progress as growing out
of knowledge gained in basic research. Technology arises from the
application of the outcome of epistemically driven research to practical
problems. The applied scientist proceeds like an engineer, employing
the toolkit of established principles and bringing general theories to
bear an technological challenges. The cascade model holds that pro-
moting epistemic science is the best way to stimulate technological
advancement.
The preference granted to applied science increasingly directs uni-
versity research toward practical goals; not infrequently, it is spon-
sored by industry. Public and private institutions increasingly pursue
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applied projects; the scientific work done at a university institute and a
company laboratory tend to become indistinguishable. This conver-
gence is emphasized by strong institutional links. Universities found
companies in order to market products based an their research. Com-
panies buy themselves into universities or initiate large-scale contracts
concerning Joint projects. The interest in application shapes large areas
of present-day science.
This primacy of application puts science under pressure to quickly
supply solutions to practical problems. Science is the first institution
called an if advice in practical matters is needed. This applies across the
board to economic challenges (such as measures apt to stimulate the
economy), environmental problems (such as global climate change or
ozone layer depletion), or biological risks (such as AIDS or bovine
spongiform encephalopathy, BSE). The reputation of science depends
an whether it reliably delivers an such issues. The question naturally
arises, then, whether this pressure toward quick, tangible, and useful
results is likely to alter the shape of scientific research and to compro-
mise the epistemic values that used to characterize it.
There are reasons for concern. Given the intertwining of science and
technology, it is plausible to assume that the dominance of technologi-
cal interests affects science as a whole. The high esteem for marketable
goods could shape pure research in that only certain problem areas are
addressed and that proposed solutions are judged exclusively by their
technological suitability. That is, the dominant technological interests
might narrow the agenda of research and encourage sloppy quality
judgments. The question is what the search for control of natural phe-
nomena does to science and whether it interferes with the search for
knowledge.
On the Relation between Knowledge and Power
Underlying these considerations is the notion that pure and applied sci-
ence differ in nature. Otherwise, the endeavor to clarify the relationship
between the two would not make sense. In contrast to this presupposi-
tion, it is argued in some quarters that science is intrinsically practical.
The only appropriate yardstick of scientific achievement is usefulness or
public benefit. In this vein, Philip Kitcher denounces the view that the
chief aim of science is to seek the truth as the "myth of purity" and
advances the contrasting idea of a "well-ordered science" whose sole
Knowledge and Control 277
commitment is satisfaction of the preferences of the citizens in a society
(Kitcher 2001, 85-86, 117-18). "Well-ordered science" is an ideal
Kitcher wants scientists to pursue; it is not intended as description of
reality. Still, his approach squares well with a widely shared feeling that
practical use or technology is what science is essentially all about. Given
a commitment of this sort, no significant distinction between theory
and practice or between knowledge and power can be drawn.
It is true, indeed, that claims to the effect that the touchstone of
epistemic significance is practical success originate with the Scientific
Revolution. However, it is also true that these commitments largely
remained mere declarations. Take Christopher Wren who was familiar
with the newly discovered Newtonian mechanics when he constructed
St. Paul's Cathedral. The Newtonian laws were deemed to disclose the
blueprint of the universe, but they were unsuitable for solving prac-
tically important problems of mechanics. Wren had to resort to medi-
eval craft rules instead. Likewise, the steam engine was developed in an
endless series of trials and errors without assistance from scientific
theory (Hacking 1983, 162-63). Thermodynamics was only brought
to bear an the machine decades after its invention was completed (see
below). This gap between science and technology is not completely
filled today. Theoretical work an cosmic inflation will hardly ever bear
technological fruit. Such work is driven exclusively by curiosity; pure
knowledge gain is the focus. Conversely, screening procedures in the
development of medical drugs possess neither theoretical basis nor
theoretical import. In such procedures, cellular or physiological effects
of substances are detected and identified by using routine methods.
They involve a more sophisticated form of trial and error.
1 conclude that there have been and still are purely epistemic and
purely practical research projects. Neither is science inherently practi-
cal, nor is technology inherently scientific. This means that the distinc-
tion between basic research and technology development needs to be
upheld. And this, in turn, suggests that the relationship between seek-
ing the truth and developing some useful device merits a more thor-
ough consideration.
The connection between science and technology becomes manifest
only in the nineteenth century. The now familiar pattern that a tech-
nological innovation emerges from the application of scientific theory
is an achievement that succeeds the Scientific Revolution by roughly
two centuries. The cascade model is intended to capture this more
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recent relationship between scientific knowledge and practical use. The
idea is that technological progress grows out of scientific theorizing.
Technology really is applied science. This model can be taken to in-
volve the twofold claim of substantive and causal dependence of tech-
nology an science; that is, the operation of some technical device can
be accounted for within a relevant theory, and the device was devel-
oped by applying the theory. According to the cascade model, the
logical and the temporal relations run parallel : theoretical principles
are formulated first; technical devices are constructed afterward by
spelling out consequences of these principles.
Overtaxing Science by Application
Scientists themselves are sometimes found articulating concerns to the
effect that applied science involves a reduction of the high methodolog-
ical standards that characterize basic research. Organizations of scien-
tists - like the German Stifterverband für die deutsche Wissenschaft -
warn that science is too heavily put into the Service of social, political,
and economic interests. This outside pressure is assumed to weaken the
epistemic control procedures inherent in respectable research . Insuffi-
ciently confirmed ideas are aired publicly and passed prematurely as
scientific knowledge. Others agree with the diagnosis but find nothing
wrong with the methodological changes possibly induced by applica-
tion orientation . It is argued that the need to address complex issues
tends to increase the uncertainty of scientific claims, encourages inter-
disciplinary cooperation , and promotes inclusion of social values into
research . But these features are not considered a cause of concern; they
are instead welcomed as signaling a many-voiced , less monolithic, and
more democratic structure of science (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1994).
Let nie address the issue of possible methodological differences be-
tween applied and basic science more systematically. A plausible mech-
anisin of methodological erosion appears to be operative in applied
science. The pressure an scientists to quickly deliver useful recipes
drives science toward addressing increasingly complex issues. The rea-
son is that phenomena and effects that can be put to technological use
are only rarely easy to capture theoretically. Applied science is denied
the privilege of basic research to select its problems according to their
tractability. Applied science cannot confine itself to areas in which
effects appear without distortions, idealizations hold, and approxima-
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tions work satisfactorily. Instead, applied science has to face intricacy
and lack of perspicuity (Krohn and van den Daele 1997, 194-95, 199-
200).
The need to address complex situations tends to overburden science.
lt is plausible that scientists respond to such excess demands by adopt-
ing tentative epistemic strategies . This methodological erosion is likely
to extend to theory structures and criteria of judgment. Application-
dominated science could consist of diverse collections of clusters, each
of which might comprise specific assumptions unconnected by a unify-
ing theoretical bond; that is, models invoked in applied science could be
at once internally heterogeneous and differ substantially from one an-
other. Likewise , scientists might appraise suggested models exclusively
an their potential for intervention . It would be sufficient for accepting a
proposed model that it enables control. The goal to reach an under-
standing of natural phenomena would be abandoned . Elucidating
causal mechanisms or embedding them in the System of knowledge
might be taken as an epistemic luxury that applied research cannot
afford.
There are indications for such an overtaxing of science by its ap-
plication and the ensuing resort to tentative epistemic strategies. Three
methodological features can be observed whose combined or marked
appearance tends to be characteristic of applied science: local models
rather than unified theories , contextualized causal relations rather
than causal mechanisms, real-world experiments rather than labora-
tory experiments conducted for answering theoretical questions.
First, at least some areas of applied research contain collections of
specific models of narrow scope, only loosely tied together by shared
principles . This is true, for instance, of large parts of cognitive psychol-
ogy or economics. The number of model-specific assumptions is large,
and it is these particular claims that bear the explanatory burden.
Second, not only do such models lack common principles, but the
causal claims entertained therein are often highly contextualized. Con-
textualized causal relations only hold under typical or normal condi-
tions and leave the pertinent causal processes out of consideration (see
below). A third characteristic of applied science is the high portion of
"real-world experiments " that investigate the entities or devices in
question during their practical use. Such experimental strategies are
the result of limitations in accounting for the pertinent issues within a
more comprehensive theoretical framework. The complexity of the
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situation renders laboratory studies useless. Theoretical understanding
is not sufficiently advanced to allow the transfer of insights gained
under controlled conditions to the Situation at hand. Thus, real-world
experiments are employed for gaining usable knowledge in the first
place, not for testing hypotheses suggested by a theoretical approach.
The eventual predominance of such Baconian experimental strategies
with their emphasis an exploration and heuristics reveals that science
operates at its epistemic limit. It tends to be overburdened by the con-
trol requirements set an science by the economy or politics.
The ecological management of waste deposits is a case in point. The
lange number of pertinent chemical reactions and their interaction with
particular soll structures make it impossible to anticipate the environ-
mental impact of certain substances by drawing an laboratory studies.
Rather, it is only the Operation of a waste deposit under real-life condi-
tions that allows one to estimate those parameters that are essential for
the appropriate construction and safe Operation of the site (Krohn
1997, 76; Krohn and van den Daele 1997, 203-6). Another example is
software development. No single person and no small group of persons
is able to understand the totality of processes that occur in a complex
computer program. This is why changes and adaptations in one Part of
the program are frequently followed by a completely unforeseen mal-
function in a different part. The early market release of such programs
is, at bottom, a real-world experiment: programs are intended to
mature with the customer. That is, mistakes are identified through
customer complaints and fixed in a piecemeal fashion. Wide areas of
application-dominated research are characterized by such strategies of
trial and error.
Prospects of a Self-Contained Applied Science
Such methodological features of applied science nourish the suspicion
that science suffers from the grip of practical demands. Theories of
fundamental science are widely expected to excel in virtues like explan-
atory power, predictive forte, or unifying capacity. By contrast, ap-
plied science seems to be characterized by local models, contextualized
causal relations, and exploratory experimentation. The explanatory
and unifying bearing of theory apparently falls to extend to technologi-
cal challenges. On the face of it, applied science is methodologically
deficient as compared to fundamental science.
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On the other hand, the cascade model of applied science provides a
safeguard against worries of methodological decline. The cascade
model assumes a unidirectional dependence of applied science an fun-
damental research. If this were appropriate, pure science would not be
at risk by the emphasis an application. First, an this model, pure re-
search is the presupposition for enduring technological Innovation so
that a unidirectional dependence of technology an science ensues. Sec-
ond, fundamental knowledge cannot be produced according to a pre-
conceived plan; it needs creativity or the spark of genius. Moreover, the
relevance of a piece of fundamental knowledge for a given practical
challenge cannot reliably be estimated in advance. It follows that fun-
damental research has to be conducted in a broad fashion and without
bearing a particular application in mind. Conversely, if you narrowly
focus an technological development, you dry up the potential for Fu-
ture technological progress. The concentration an practical problems
would eventually deprive science of its capacity to solve practical Prob-
lems. Given the unidirectional dependence of applied science an funda-
mental research, the search for control demands the pursuit of knowl-
edge. Pure science would be safe. As a consequence, the demanding
methodological standards, supposed to be inherent in basic research,
would be maintained in applied science.
But philosophers of science and scientists alike have cast doubt an
the cascade model. Nancy Cartwright is a prominent example. In her
view, overarching laws or high-brow theories do not gain access to
concrete phenomena. The laws of physics fall to account for large parts
of the physical world. She approvingly refers to an example of Neu-
rath's who pointed out that Newtonian mechanics is embarrassingly
silent an the path of a thousand-dollar bill swept away by the wind in
Vienna's St. Stephen's square (Cartwright 1996, 318 ). In her conception
of a dappled reality, the only way to take a grip an the phenomena is by
making use of local models that are tightly locked onto a particular
problem. Descriptive adequacy only extends to small-scale accounts;
comprehensive theories inevitably lose touch with the phenomena. The
patchwork quilt, not the pyramid, symbolizes the structure of scientific
knowledge (322-23).
The physicist Silvan Schweber advocates a similar ontological pic-
ture - if for different reasons. Schweber attributes a layered structure
to reality, with each such layer arising from the complex organization
of matter. A relation of "objective emergence" is thought to obtain
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among the pertinent properties, according to which the study of each
level of complexity is as fundamental in its nature as any other. In spite
of their hierarchical order, the higher-level account is not just the ap-
plied science of one level below. That is, the theories that address the
different levels of organization are essentially decoupled from one an-
other. Elementary-particle physics has virtually no implications for
atomic physics or solid-state physics (Schweber 1993, 35-36, 38).
The relationship between fundamental theory and practical applica-
tion, as envisaged by these positions, is at variance with the cascade
model. The message is that pure science largely falls to meet applied
challenges. Practical problems are to be attacked directly and without
a detour through fundamental research. There is only a minor knowl-
edge transfer from the constituents of matter to complex aggregates.
Fundamental truths do not produce technological spin-offs.
The adoption of this point of view brings a mixed message in its
train. lt entails, an the one hand, that the structure of pure science is
much more akin to the assumed nature of applied science than antici-
pated. Part of the worries mentioned before draw an the alleged con-
trast between the overarching and unified theoretical edifice of pure
science, and the collection of heterogeneous small-scale models sup-
posedly distinctive of applied science. However, an the sketched point
of view, pure science may likewise comprise a collection of scattered
and divergent approaches.
Actually, an attenuated version of Cartwright's position can pass as
the now standard view of theory structure in epistemic science. This
standard view grants that general theories capture concrete phenom-
ena, to be sure, but only if assisted by auxiliaries peculiar to the Situa-
tion in question. Models are mediators between overarching theories
and concrete phenomena, and these models involve divergent assump-
tions. At most, these models stand in a relation of family resemblance
(as the semantic view has lt); but they may even comprise contradictory
principles and fail to form a coherent whole (Hacking 1983, 216-19;
Morrison 1998, 70-81).
Abandoning the cascade model is good news, therefore, in that this
move mitigates the perceived contrast between pure and applied sci-
ence and makes applied science look more like respectable epistemic
research. Even granted that applied science only contained problem-
specific approaches that employed heterogeneous assumptions, ap-
plied science would not necessarily lag behind epistemic research in
1
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methodological respects. The bad news is that the safety cord is there-
by lost. 1 explained that within the cascade model the best way to
promote applied science is to foster pure science. If the cascade model
is relinquished, applied science can take care of itself. Given the pre-
dominance of practical concerns, lt becomes a live Option that pure
science is pushed toward the sidelines.
Applied Science and Contextualized Causal Relations
These considerations reveal that the relationship between epistemic
and applied science is a matter of debate. The best way to resolve such
a contentious issue is to address concrete cases. Let me examine the
example of contextualized causal relations. 1 mentioned before that the
restriction to such relations is one of the possibly characteristic meth-
odological features of applied science. In reality, causal relations typ-
ically form complex networks. A cause does not produce an effect
completely an its own but through a sequence of intermediate events.
Causality operates through processes or mechanisms. Moreover, a
multiplicity of causes may bring about the Same effect. The epistemic
attitude attempts to understand this web of parallel series of concate-
nated events. The pragmatic attitude aims at intervention and control.
Pragmatic investigations focus an cause-effect relationships that pre-
vail under "typical" conditions and are thus usually sufficient for
bringing about the effect. Such contextualized causal relations incor-
porate a large number of presuppositions; they are thus confined to
"normal" circumstances. In other words, such relationships are mas-
sively hedged with ceteris paribus clauses.
Starting a car is an example. A pertinent causal relation is turning
the ignition key Sets the motor in motion. But this effect only follows if
a chain of intermediate processes manifest itself. The causal capacity of
the ignition key considered in itself falls to bring about the desired
effect. The turning of the key closes an electric circuit, which instigates
a series of other events that eventually produce the start of the engine.
The gven causal relationship passes in silence over these further condi-
tions; they are tacitly incorporated. The act of turning is neither suffi-
cient nor necessary for starting a car. lt does not produce the effect but
merely triggers it.
The turning of the ignition key and the car's starting are connected
by a contextualized causal relationship. Such a relationship only holds
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if the embedding causal network operates as tacitly presumed. Con-
textualized causal relationships are confined to normal circumstances
and consequently suffer from exceptions . They collapse if one of these
tacit clauses is no longer fulfilled. If the spark plug is wet , all turning
serves for nothing. In addition , such relationships fail to elucidate the
connection between cause and effect . They leave the underlying causal
chains unaddressed.
The concentration an contextualized causal relationships is some-
times considered a hallmark of the "practical sciences ." Take the phi-
losopher of history Robin Collingwood who already in 1940 charac-
terized this pragmatic attitude by its renunciation of a comprehensive
analysis of the pertinent causal network : "If 1 find that 1 can get a result
by certain means, 1 may be sure that 1 should not be getting it unless a
great many conditions were fulfilled ; but so long as 1 get it 1 do not
mind what these conditions are. If owing to a change in one of them 1
fall to get it, 1 still do not want to know what they all are; 1 only want to
know what the one is that has changed " ( Collingwood , quoted in Fox
Keller 2000, 142). This means that the scope of the practical sciences is
narrow. Knowledge is important only to the extent that it is necessary
for enabling successful intervention . The underlying assumption is that
it is possible to intervene dependably an the basis of fragmentary
knowledge. Technology is taken not to rely essentially an a deeper
understanding of the pertinent generalizations.
Biotechnology and the Life Sciences
In the course of the last two decades, the life sciences have developed
into one of the most important fields of applied science. Biological
processes have been subjected to a large number of human interven-
tions. Molecular genetics or genetic engineering play a leading role in
this area. Its pivot is the assumption of a fixed connection between
genes and organismic features or between genes and proteins. On the
basis of such unainbiguous connections, genetic engineering nourishes
the hope for - or the fear of - specific interventions in organismic pro-
cesses.
Genetic engineering frequently draws an contextualized causal rela-
tionships. The way the so-called eyeless gene is put to use is a case in
point. This gene is found in the species Drosophila, the common fruit
fly, but it possesses homologs in mice and men. It controls for the
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morphogenesis of the eyes of flies. If the Operation of the gene is blocked
or lost, no eyes are formed - which is why the gene is somewhat mis-
leadingly called "eyeless." If the homologous mouse gene is implanted
and expressed in Drosophila, it instigates the formation of fly eyes, not
mouse eyes.
The expression of the eyeless gene in suitable tissue is sufficient for
eye formation; that is, eyes can be generated by appropriate stimula-
tion in the legs or wings of flies. This is the reason for calling eyeless the
"master control gene for eye morphogenesis." But the eyeless gene only
sets off a complex series of intertwined genetic processes that only in
their entirety control eye formation. This is evidenced by the men-
tioned fact that the homologous mouse gene stimulates the expression
of fly eyes in fly tissue. The eyeless gene operates as a trigger that needs
the appropriate causal environment in order to become effective (Fox
Keller 2000, 96-97). In its causal role, this gene is comparable to the
ignition key. When an ignition lock is removed from a fashionable
convertible and built into a battered pick-up truck, the turn of the key
sets the truck engine in motion, not the motor of the convertible.
The upshot is that the identification of eyeless allows the control of
eye morphogenesis without theoretical understanding of the underly-
ing processes. Results of that sort are taken as a basis for a declaration
of independence of technology from science that is enunciated within
the biotechnologist camp. The background to this judgment of irrele-
vance is the widespread assessment that the life sciences are presently
undergoing a revolution regarding the understanding of the interrela-
tionship between genetic and somatic processes: genomics is being
replaced by proteomics. Genomics was governed by the idea of genetic
determinism according to which the properties of a cell are fixed by its
genes. This is contested by the rival approach of proteomics, which
emphasizes the fact that many cell properties are the result of an intri-
cate interaction among proteins. To be sure, proteins are produced by
genes, but they are still subject to generalizations of their own; general-
izations, that is, that are not encoded in DNA. In principle, limitations
of the scope of the genome arise from the fact that external factors may
influence the expression of genes in a cell. Such external factors escape
the grip of the genome of the corresponding cell, but they contribute to
determining which genes are active and which remain switched off.
This means that a full account of cell properties cannot be reduced to
the DNA-level but has to address, at least in part, protein interaction
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directly. This transition from genomics to proteomics is viewed by the
biologist Richard Strohman as a "coming Kuhnian revolution" (Stroh-
man 1997, 194). Similarly, Evelyn Fox Keller considers the twentieth
century as "the century of the gene." After the turn of the century we
realized the Jeep rift between genetic information and biological func-
tion (Fox Keller 2000, 8).
The crucial aspect is that this thesis of the conceptual and theoretical
insufficiency of genomics frequently goes along with holding fast to the
notion of the gehe for pragmatic reasons. In spite of her judgment that
this notion is fundamentally flawed, Fox Keller continues to accept
gene as a useful concept that refers to "handles" for Intervention. Ge-
netic manipulation is suitable for producing effects in a uniform, pre-
dictable fashion, albeit the reliability of the relevant causal relation-
ships is constrained to particular sets of conditions (Fox Keller 2000,
141-42). The saure separation between scientific adequacy and tech-
nological importance is advanced by William Bains, who works as a
consultant for biotechnology companies. Bains argues that genetic de-
terminism is superseded and discarded in bioscience but rules unques-
tioned in biotechnology. It is true, the assumption of a dose connection
between gene and organismic property is scientifically dubious, but it
still constitutes a lever for opening the black box of life. Genes and
their products are tools for achieving technological progress and for
bringing about intended effects. Scientific truths are not necessary for
this purpose. This is shown, among other things, by the fact that wrong
conceptions as to the mechanisms of sulfonamids, aspirin, or penicillin
prevailed for a long time. Technology aims at practical success, which
is achieved by the identification of levers to pull and switches to press.
Focusing an truths about the underlying causal processes is bound to
generate confusion in biotechnology (Bains 1997).
The common ground of all these judgments is that biotechnology
rests an contextualized causal relationships whose appropriateness is
independent, in large measure, from the truth of more fundamental,
high-brow theories. In particular, successful Intervention need not rely
an disclosing the relevant causal mechanisms. Knowledge and control
are taken to be decoupled, and the commitment to truth is sacrificed
for the capacity of Intervention.
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Bioscience as a Basis of Biotechnology
It follows that there are indications of the attitude of the "practical
sciences." That is, some projects in the realm of "research and develop-
ment" are confined to the mere production of an effect. If the interven-
tion is successful, no further questions are posed. Restriction to and
satisfaction with contextualized causal relationships bear witness to
the suspected methodological decline: no elucidation of the causal
mechanism is attempted, no Integration of the local relationship into
the wider body of knowledge is sought. Taken together with the prima
facie evidence for the other methodological features presented earlier,
namely, local modeling and real-world experimentation, there is rea-
son to believe that tentative epistemic strategies are employed in ap-
plied science.
The follow-up question is whether attitudes of this sort prevail in
applied science. A definite answer to this question requires a more
extensive survey of applied research projects (1 am involved in onel).
But a preliminary answer can be given by drawing an circumstantial
evidence and an in-principle argument. 1 restrict consideration to the
role of contextualized causal relations in biotechnology and suggest
that both sources render it unlikely that appeal to such relationships
dominates applied science.
Relevant circumstantial evidence is provided by the fact that we do
witness the mentioned revolution in bioscience, namely, the replace-
ment of genomics by proteomics. If it is true that biotechnology is fine
with genomics, and if it is further true that biotechnology sets the
research agenda, no such revolution should occur. As long as genomics
successfully underwrites biotechnological practice, and we are told it
still does, genomics should be here to stay. The fact that a conceptual
transition is nevertheless underway testifies to the fact that there is
more to applied science than contextualized causal relationships.
A large number of observations point in the same direction. Re-
search projects in biotechnology frequently aim to identify the net-
work of generalizations and causal mechanisms that bear an a particu-
lar causal relationship. For instance, the development of new medical
drugs often draws an advanced knowledge of the underlying cellular
processes. Drugs are designed by relying an insights about the molecu-
lar nature of the disease. In this area progress in therapy is sought by
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way of clarifying the molecular mechanisms whose malfunction is the
physiological basis of the disease.
Let us look a little more closely at the example of antibiotics research.
This endeavor is certainly technological in nature; the driving force is
the development of effective treatment
. It is true that the first step into
this field was taken without any deeper knowledge. Alexander Fleming
discovered the antibiotic efficacy of penicillin by chance
. Substances
with similar capacities can be found by screening, that is, again, without
understanding the underlying processes
. However, the next step re-
quires appeal to more fundamental knowledge . Namely, sustained
treatment with antibiotics produces resistance . The efficacy of antibi-
otics decreases since bacterial variants are selected whose molecular
structure is less vulnerable to antibiotic action. For instance, some
antibiotics interfere with the formation of the bacterial cell wall
. Resis-
tant bacteria employ peptids of a slightly changed structure for building
up their cell walls so that the molecules of the antibiotic no longer
combine with sufficient intensity to these peptids. Disclosing the details
of this mechanism makes it possible to develop countermeasures. The
molecules of the antibiotic are modified such that they connect tightly to
the changed wall peptids and thus regain their original efficacy.
1 take this pattern to be typical . Contextualized causal relations, like
the antibiotic efficacy of penicillin , may indeed provide a basis for
some limited intervention in an organismic process. But if distortions
arise, such contextualized relations with their long list of hedging
clauses attached are of no use anymore. Additional influences invali-
date one of these tacit clauses so that the generalization fails to become
manifest . We are faced with an exception to the generalization. Re-
instating its validity or regaining the power of intervention requires
getting such disturbing influences under control . This can be achieved
either by checking these influences or by blocking their adverse effects.
In most cases , the latter route is the only way to go, and proceeding an
this path demands taking account of the relevant mechanism. Conse-
quently, maintaining the efficacy of a procedure in the presence of
distortions requires theoretical understanding of the causal chains at
hand. Sophisticated intervention requires deeper insights
. At the ad-
vanced technological level presently addressed, there is no way to de-
couple control from knowledge.
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Application Innovation or How to Hook Up Technology with Science
The import of this conclusion is not confined to antibiotics research
nor to biotechnology. Rather, applied science in general is bound for
inethodological reasons to transcend itself and to grow into fundamen-
tal science. This is the in-principle argument mentioned earlier. Lack of
a deeper understanding eventually darkens the technological pros-
pects. But theoretically understood causal relations provide many
more opportunities for intervention and control than do contextual-
ized causal relationships
. The theoretical explanation or integration
heightens the chances to bring other factors to bear an the process at
hand and to twist the latter so that it delivers more efficiently or relia-
bly what is demanded. A good theory is extremely practical.
On the one hand, applied science is tempted by its practical nature
to be satisfied with contextualized causal relations. The challenge is to
figure out which switches are to be pressed to achieve some desired
effect. Theoretical understanding is not among the objectives. On the
other hand, applied science does not yield - at least not unreservedly
or not always
- to the temptation to merely give generalizations heav-
ily laced with ceteris paribus clauses. There is a subtle mechanism at
work that keeps basic research right within the applied ballpark. Prac-
tical challenges often bring fundamental problems in their wake. Such
challenges cannot appropriately be met without treating these funda-
mental problems as well. Basic research is among the resuits of applied
science; the former is engendered by the latter. A consequence is that
innovative explanatory approaches that are relevant for basic research
frequently arise within applied research projects. This feature 1 call
application innovation
. It involves the emergence of theoretically sig-
nificant novelties within the framework of use-oriented research proj-
ects.
A large number of such use
-oriented projects in the life sciences
address questions of theoretical impact. They furnish innovative solu-
tions to problems of epistemic relevance and are thus different from
sciences like astrophysics or paleontology, an the one hand, which are
pursued out of pure curiosity , as well as from engineering or the de-
velopment of marketable goods, an the other. The inquiry into the
genetic and enzymatic processes that control cell division is an example
of research at this intermediate level. The knowledge is about the foun-
dations of cellular reduplication, but at the Same time it offers pros-
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pects of intervention if cell division gets out of hand. These studies
were conducted in order to achieve a more effective cancer therapy
(which practical interest is underscored by the fact that the Nobel prize
for medicine was awarded to the corresponding scientists). Yet they
also generated fundamental insights into the mechanism of cell divi-
sion.
Likewise, the revolutionary conception of prions was elaborated in
the practical context of identifying infectious agents. Prions were con-
ceived of as infectious proteins that assumedly reproduce without as-
sistance of nucleic acids (DNA or RNA). The initial aim of the inves-
tigation was to gain useful knowledge about the sheep disease scrapie;
later the bovine ailment BSE moved toward center stage. But the Im-
pact of this study was a deep-reaching transformation of biological
concepts. The pursuit of a practical question produced a profound
theoretical innovation regarding biological reproduction.
This is by no means an exclusive feature of present-day science.
Rather, since the nineteenth century theoretical knowledge proves in-
creasingly helpful for tackling practical problems. One of the early
exemplars of application innovation is Sadi Carnot's 1820 treatise an
the motive power of heat. Its declared aim was to analyze and improve
the workings of the steam engine. To accomplish this aim, Carnot
introduced the seminal concepts of thermodynamic cycle and thermal
efficiency. These concepts are of enduring theoretical significance.
Cases of this sort do not instantiate the familiar pattern that tech-
nology draws an scientific knowledge. To be sure, this cascade pattern
is manifest in many cases. But my point is that the converse is also true
and that knowledge of nature's workings may grow out of the attempt
to master technological challenges. Application innovation is seen at
work in such cases.
Eventually, the very formation of science as a rule-governed episte-
mic enterprise goes back to this pattern of problem generation that
directs scientists from application to foundation. Answers to practical
problems were sought by elaborating theoretical accounts. A purely
theoretical interest was only rarely dominant in the history of science.
What mattered was knowledge useful for the betterment of the human
condition. The scientific method with its stringent demands an the
acceptance of hypotheses contributes to ascertaining the reliability of
practically relevant knowledge. For instance, unified explanation and
causal analysis rank highly among the widely shared methodological
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virtues. These virtues codify in the first place what knowledge or un-
derstanding is all about. We understand a phenomenon when we are
able to embed it in a nomological framework, and we grasp a causal
relationship when we can account for the process leading fron the
cause to the effect.
These same virtues are also essential for successful research an prac-
tical matters. 1 mentioned that the theoretical integration of a general-
ization or the clarification of intermediate processes facilitate interven-
tion. Furthermore, restricting contextualized causal relationships to a
narrow claes of conditions seriously impedes their transfer to other
situations. By contrast, theoretically understood relationships can
more easily be generalized and applied to a wider range of conditions.
Consequently, the latter sort of relationship is more useful in practical
respects.
It follows that the primacy of application need not pose a threat to
the epistemic dignity of science. Theoretical unification and causal
analysis are inherent in both pure and applied science, because such
methodological virtues promote understanding and intervention at the
same time. Applied questions are treated best when they are not treated
exclusively as applied questions. Thus, scientific method provides a
safety cord that secures the epistemic respectability of applied science.
Application innovation thus entails a partial vindication of the cas-
cade model. While Cartwright is right in her claim that concrete Prob-
lems need to be treated using local means, such narrow approaches
naturally grow into more comprehensive ones and stimulate the treat-
ment of fundamental issues. This second aspect of a natural tendency
toward enlarging the explanatory scope matches well with the cascade
model in one respect but falls to fit it in another respect. Scope enlarge-
ment agrees with the cascade model in that practical answers are best
given by exploring theoretical problems. Technical devices are often
developed by elaborating consequences of some theory. But this same
aspect is at odds with the cascade model in that the theory need not
precede the application. The cascade model says that the most effective
way to foster applied science is to support pure science. My argument
is intended to show that stimulation may proceed in the opposite direc-
tion. Temporally speaking, insights of epistemic relevance may grow
out of practical projects. In contrast to the cascade model, the logical
and temporal relationships between science and technology sometimes
run in opposite directions.
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Conclusion
The message here is twofold. While it is true, an the one hand, that
applied science is more prone to methodological sloppiness than episte-
mic research, one the other hand, there are shared values that act as a
safeguard against wholesale methodological decline. It is to be granted
that the dominance of science by practical purposes brings adverse
effects in its wake. The agenda of science is largely monopolized by
technological challenges, and the importance of research done in pri-
vate companies compromises the public accessibility of knowledge. As
to the first, application dominance markedly influences the selection of
issues treated by science. Regarding the second, the somewhat excessive
secrecy that covers a great deal of industrial research tends to reinstate
the traditional Separation between scholarship and society at large that
was gradually resolved by the Scientific Revolution. Not all worries
about an application-dominated science can be dispelled.
However, there is a more positive message as well: application dom-
inance eventually poses no serious threat to the epistemic respectability
of science. Applied science is no less concerned with trustworthiness
and reliability than pure science, and methodological values like theo-
retical unification and causal analysis are tried and tested means for
accomplishing these practical purposes as well. Whereas applied sci-
ence brings to bear additional practical values like efficiency, low cost,
or environmental friendliness, there is continuity among the epistemic
values accepted in both fields. In the end, the striving for control is not
likely to override the commitment to knowledge.
NOTES
1. This research is part of the project "Toward the Knowledge Society" pursued at
the Institute for Science and Technology Studies at Bielefeld University and sponsored
by the Volkswagen Foundation and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.
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